

Introduction

The Information Warfare Community Human Capital Strategy (HCS) aligns directly with the Secretary of the Navy's HCS, the Chief of Naval Operations' guidance, and the corporate Navy HCS. We envision this strategy providing other Navy communities and resource sponsors, Information Warfare officers, and deckplate cryptologic technicians a mutual set of expectations that define content rich work for the community, and describe how individuals will be developed and managed to accomplish its mission. As the Information Warfare community, we must seize this historic opportunity to dramatically increase our combat power and contributions to national security. Our transformation will challenge our assumptions while treasuring our traditions, in pursuit of far greater achievements. This document describes why we must transform, the analysis behind the strategy, and the impact on our force. Our strategy delivers the right skills at the right place at the right time and sets a course for lasting Maritime Information Dominance.

Higher-level guidance



The Department of the Navy faces a number of significant challenges as it transforms from a Cold War force to a more agile and technology-based force. The dramatic and accelerating costs of personnel and personnel-related programs, now approaching 70 percent of the department's total obligational authority, will squeeze or curtail critical investments in


acquisition and other necessary operations and maintenance accounts. **The Department of the Navy will divest itself of those activities / functions that are no longer relevant to our core mission.** We will assess our core competencies, determine what functions are inherently governmental, and carefully consider the cost of personnel. As a rule, we will contract out those functions determined to be non-governmental.



The Navy's Human Capital Strategy is to become a leaner, smarter, and more adaptive force and increase the speed and agility of our great institution to get the *right people* with the *right skills* to the *right place* at the *right time*, and provide them with the professional and personal tools to succeed. The foundational tenets of the corporate Navy HCS are alignment to total force, competency-focused, professional / personal growth, agile

organizations, and performance culture. Alignment to the Total Force provides the vehicle to capture the competencies and skill sets of our entire workforce to optimize the best-value manpower mix of military (active, reserve, officers, enlisted) and civilian (government and contractors)


to support Navy and Joint missions. Fundamental to achieving the right mix is an understanding of the competencies and skill sets that are resident (as is) in the workforce, as well as those that are desired (to be) to meet the capabilities demand signal of our Force Commanders. A capabilities-based and competency-focused workforce and its associated



processes enable our leadership to take advantage of every component of the workforce, military and civilian personnel, to meet current and emerging personnel demand signals from organizations that accomplish missions and goals. Broader than just training and development, our **professional / personal growth** focus must be the creation of

opportunities through education, training, mentoring and experience to achieve a motivated, committed, and fully capable workforce within a corporate culture that embraces individual growth and development to include having work/life balance. We must develop **agile organizations** that have the speed, flexibility and robustness to match emerging and enduring personnel demand signals. Gaining the ability to leverage, flex, adapt and rapidly apply the diverse and dispersed competencies of our workforce is critical to our success in modern warfare. Finally, transforming Navy culture to a **performance culture** requires the

organization to set clear expectations against measurable objectives and reward behavior that creates value along our core business lines. Work to date on the Navy HCS has focused on the six-factor framework spelled out in the book, *Play to Your Strengths*, challenging Navy leaders to **insist on systems thinking** vice point solutions, **get the right facts** vice managing from anecdotal information, and **focus intently on value creation**. The corporate Navy HCS provides the framework for vetting initiatives that affect other communities and recommending changes to Navy programs and incentives that will enable the transformation described above.




Analysis behind the strategy

As the Navy transforms and moves toward a capabilities-based, competency-focused force, discrete warfare areas must develop coordinated strategies to deliver on those capabilities. We are the Navy’s Information Warfare workforce and must implement a Human Capital Strategy that redefines the work performed by our community as: a **warfighting discipline** with its main roots in Cryptology, **that hunts, understands and changes the information environment** to meet peace, crisis, and wartime objectives. We must attract and retain the **best qualified people**, equip them with **networked capabilities** to capitalize on any Navy, Joint, or National asset, in order to **create information advantages** where and when required. To achieve this vision, we have developed an HCS that focuses our future community on our core business by (1) determining **where we were applying our human capital strategy** along business lines and function areas in the as-is




condition, (2) **identify value** to the Navy, and nation, of the products and services those business lines generate, (3) **determine military essentiality** of the functions performed by the work force, and (4) **architect tangible career paths to deliver predictable and most-valued knowledge, skills, and abilities** with state-of-the-art education and responsive incentives.

(1) Where were we applying human capital strategy (as-is condition)? By categorizing each of the 14,000+ billets in the Information Warfare community by the business lines and functional areas described in the inset above, we were able to take broad-brush “current fix” that shows how much of the community is focused on non-operations (or non-content rich) work. First and foremost, our strategy is to transition all support and enterprise support functions to contract, civil service, or other ratings (as their HCS allows) – more specifics to follow – to focus our community on delivering what it is that the Navy and nation values - information warfare vice support.



(2) Identify value. Central to the CNO’s tasking on developing community strategies was to develop a Human Capital Value chain that links:

- **Organizational Outcomes:** What’s a win look like? How do we know it? What’s unique?
- **Performance Drivers:** What will cause us to win in the way we want to win?
- **Human Capital Deliverables:** What do we need from our workforce to predictably get the performance drivers?
- **Human Capital Architecture:** How do we set up billet structure, career path, and workforce management systems to build Human Capital Deliverables (predictive and desirable knowledge, skills, and abilities)?



We have defined our most-valued **organizational outcomes** as:

- **Information Dominance** over any adversary facing a maritime or joint commander
- Guaranteed and predictable relevance to each step of the **time sensitive targeting cycle** (find, fix, track, target, engage, & assess) in seconds, to include real and executable (in seconds) **non-kinetic strike solutions**
- Maintaining the **technological edge** over potential adversary's ability to operate in the radio frequency and network portions of the battlespace

The **performance drivers** that will deliver those outcomes include:

- **Accountability for the unseen** portion of the battlespace
- **Predictive analysis** that tells the commander what the enemy is *going to do* based on deep knowledge of indicators vice reporting what the enemy *has done*
- **Find, locate, and access the enemy for insight and attack on the network and in the radio frequency (RF) spectrum**

Delivering value


- **Bringing the full arsenal of national resources to bear on the Commander's immediate priorities**
- **Embedding operational experience into national analysis**
- **Predictive analysis**
 - Knowing norms, trends, indicators
- **Accountability for the "unseen battlespace"**
- **Expertise on the national system's access to the target**
- **Inform "want it," automate "get it," focus humans on "know it" and "use it"**
 - Measure value at "use it"

We can only deliver those drivers if our workforce possesses the following **Human Capital Deliverables**:

- Knowledge of the **enemy's norms, trends, and indicators**
- Knowledge of **how the signal or network protocol was designed to work**
- Knowledge of **how national systems are aligned** against what matters most to the maritime or joint commander


In order to build and develop those deliverables (predictive and desirable knowledge, skills, and abilities), we must design a **Human Capital Architecture** that provides:

- **Tangible career paths** for each rating / designator that interleave the workforce through national and operational tours
- **State-of-the-art education** that contributes to this value chain (ie: language degrees for language analysts, area studies degrees for operational analysts / future IW planners, communications degrees for signals analysts / future signals weapons developers, and networking degrees for networks analysts / future network weapons developers)
- **Responsive incentives** that focus



on the most valued work irrespective of pay-grade and on delivering a needed skill vice paying entire ratings or NECs

To create value, we believe that **specialization** is key to our most-valued services; **standardizing processes** is critical to reliable, predictable, and measurable outcomes; more **focus on target** development is necessary to shorten / enable the kill chain; and **collocating our deploying workforce with NSA national centers** is required to adequately leverage the national community and systems and more importantly, to **provide our work force daily access to the enemy** for exploitation and attack on behalf of the operational commander.



(3) Determine military essentiality of the functions performed by the work force.


Considering time sensitive targeting as our most challenging deliverable and by definition, a Title 10 requirement, we analyzed our business lines and functional areas, temporally, under the steps of the time sensitive targeting cycle to derive which functions are military essential (Target Engagement, Target Development, and Planning). We also identified which functions could be either military or civilian and which functions should be transferred to another rating (given congruence with their HCS) or civilianized (civil service or contracted). To the greatest extent possible, non-inherently governmental work will be transformed via civilian substitution (CIVSUB) to a contracted solution in accordance with the Department of the Navy’s HCS. CIVSUB is the process of turning in military end-strength (MPN) for operating funds (OMN) to purchase either civil service positions or a contract solution.

Military Essentiality

Per the Inherently Governmental Commercial Activity (IGCA) Inventory guidelines, military essentiality billets include: operational military billets; military support elements in operating forces; wartime designated billets (dually assigned to a position in the infrastructure and counted for a wartime assignment); military unique knowledge and skills; military augmentation of infrastructure activities during a crisis, mobilization, or war; military rotation (necessary for rotation base for sea-shore/overseas assignment), or military career progression (necessary for career paths).

For each function in our community the Chief of Naval Personnel has asked us to ask the important questions:

- **Does the function still need to be done?**
- If so, **does a Sailor have to do it**, or could a more cost-effective civilian fill the position?
- **How much of our workload can – or should – be contracted out?**
- How do we **capitalize upon new and more efficient technology** in determining manpower needs for a given system?




To answer these questions, we developed a process to analyze all of our functions and raster through a decision tree to determine the right manpower source to perform valid work.

(4) Architect tangible career paths to deliver predictable and most-valued knowledge, skills, and abilities. As a community leader (supply), it is our challenge to design a billet structure that interleaves our workforce through national and operational tours in a predictable manner, yet is owned by multiple manpower budget submission officers (BSOs; formerly known as manpower claimants) (demand). The Chief of Naval Operations' vision is to reduce the number of BSOs from over thirty to just six (Fleet Forces Command; Bureau of Naval Medicine; Manpower, Personnel, Training & Education; Center for Naval Installations; Systems Command, and Director, Naval Staff), simplifying the challenge. We are working with the OPNAV staff **to identify and coordinate the portions of this strategy that affect other community leaders and BSOs.** The CNO's vision to **empower community leaders to inform requirements** will enable a coherent strategy across multiple BSOs. We are drafting a message to all of the BSOs requiring an OPNAV N1 concurrence (specifically, N122) on all billet changes affecting IW Officers (161X, 644X, & 744X) and cryptologic technicians, in order to ensure we inform each requirement for alignment with our strategy. As the owner of billets coded for other ratings and officer designators, it is our responsibility to conduct the cost / value analysis with that community's HCS to ensure that we are not civilianizing a function that is desired to be performed by military (for sea / shore rotation or for skills development purposes) or to help them by replacing an undesired military billet with an alternate manpower source.

The design of our billet architecture is founded on the following:

- Our human capital deliverables (know the target, know the signal, know how the nation's assets are aligned to deliver on that target) are best developed at the National Security Agency Centers.
 - Skills atrophy (and the target changes) while sailors don't have access to the target, signals, and national system.
- We intend to reduce our PCS-afloat footprint, instead surging sailors from working the target at a national center one day, to working the target on a Navy platform in the AOR, on the next day.
 - Sailors filling Navy-funded, deploying billets will work the target at the national center when they are not deployed for target continuity and will be an analytic resource to the Numbered Fleet commander when maritime priorities fall short of national resources.

- Delivering value requires target depth and expertise, not attainable without continuity on target. We intend to build an enlisted workforce that analyzes the same target (or region) for the majority of their career, growing into real experts that know and use information to influence the battlespace.



Strategy impact along business lines

Eliminate community military (both active and reserve component) manpower aligned to Enterprise Support related work. We have analyzed our enterprise support functions at the Navy Information Operations Commands (formerly NSGAs) to deliver a standard manpower solution across all of our sites. Our strategy is to transition community billets in these functions to either another rating that does that work (given it aligns with that community's HCS to have military perform that work at the site in question) or CIVSUB for a civil servant (given it aligns with that civilian community's HCS and is inherently governmental) or for a contract solution.

Eliminate community military manpower aligned to Support functions (formerly CTA, CTO, & CTM – administrative, communications and information technology, and maintenance). If military essential (i.e.: afloat), transition to another Fleet rating. If non-military essential (i.e.: administrative clerk, LAN maintenance, or installs, ashore), CIVSUB for either civil service or more preferably, a contract solution.

Reduce community military manpower aligned to podium training functions. When CTR, CTT, CTI, and CTN personnel are taken off-target for a tour, their target and signals skills atrophy. Focus podium / schoolhouse training on educating the Sailor on the theory

behind signals and networks and transition training on the application of that theory to the Center for Information Dominance Learning Sites at the NSA Centers, leveraging to the maximum extent, national courses already taught by NSA's training system. Using military to train on target, while working the target, or as adjunct faculty (away from the target for several weeks vice months or years) to teach military application of knowledge, aligns with this strategy and the Navy's strategy to train Sailors where they work.

Continue to employ officers, in small numbers, in Acquisition-related functions. The valuable experience that mid-grade officers bring to the acquisition process is critical to building the right future capabilities. Acquisition is one of the skills desired by corporate Navy for senior officers and while military essentiality from a Title 10 perspective could be debated, it is our strategy to invest a portion of our officers in the acquisition business line to develop corporate competencies, critical to the future Navy.

Employ officers, including warrant officers, senior enlisted, and DoN civilians in Staff-related functions. Staff duty is critical to developing our officers' warfighting and corporate competencies. Also, our warrant officers and senior enlisted provide critical target knowledge and experience to our staffs. We also believe there is a need for continuity on our major staffs that could be provided by increasing the number of DoN civilians (in lieu of staff officers) especially in the policy and doctrine functional areas. It is our strategy to remove junior military from staff functions, investing them instead in target-related, operations functions.

Shape the community billet structure aligned to INFOSEC functions. INFOSEC is focused on a "blue target" and it is not our intent to create blue target experts. It is counter to our strategy to take one of our future sailors off of a red target for a three-year tour in INFOSEC, however this is a valid mission that both the Navy and the nation requires. Sending a junior sailor who doesn't know how the Navy operates, defeats NSA's purpose for having military work the INFOSEC mission; sending senior enlisted and warrant officers who have spent a career on both national systems and operating afloat, would deliver more value. Also, we will seek to increase civilian workforce conducting INFOSEC and pursue, via other community leaders, other ratings / designators that would benefit from this work (Information Professionals / Submariners / IT rating) given it aligns with their HCS.

Maximize the number of community military billets conducting target engagement and target development (analysis). The majority of our enlisted force should be focused on work that develops deep target knowledge and deliver valued expertise at the mid and senior pay-grades. We believe that applying a small number of government civilians to the target development function makes good sense for continuity.



Strategy impact by designator / rating / civilian workforce

Special Duty Officer – Information Warfare. The 161X community will value and reward officers that “know it” and “use it” and possess the knowledge, skills, and abilities to fight, lead, and win in the maritime and joint domain:

- **Warfare Competency:** IW Officers will understand the tenets of IO, sensor / weapons and national systems capabilities and limitations, and how to optimally use them for “effects-based” warfare. IW Officers must understand the role of IO in context of multi-dimensional warfare. No warfare area fights alone - understanding undersea warfare, surface warfare, strike warfare, and air warfare is essential to fully integrating IW within the Strike Group, the Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander, and the Joint Force. We will build this competency through operational tours at the LT and LCDR pay-grades to deliver peak value during operational tours at the senior officer level.
- **Leadership:** Leadership is a core competency for all Naval Officers. We must have officers that can seize the initiative, motivate their people, effectively apply resources, and execute. We will build this competency through leadership positions that grow in scope throughout the IW officer’s career, ultimately delivering senior officers with all the tools for command in a war fighting environment.
- **Professional Expertise:** IW engineering and technology (i.e. knowing how the signal or protocol was designed function) but it is also understanding the human elements of adversaries through language and culture that are critical to planning and executing any Information Operations campaign (i.e.: knowing how the adversary operates). We will build this expertise through state-of-the-art, in-residence and continuing education programs and through a billet structure that interleaves between national and operational tours at the right time in the career path to optimize value.


IW Officer careers will be a continual blend of carefully timed national and operational tours while building Warfare competencies and Leadership skills. Every officer’s first duty station will be a regional NSA Cryptologic Center and will include:

- Target knowledge baseline (culture, history, command and control modes and nodes, signals, political themes, etc.)
- Understanding the alignment of the nation’s sensors against that target and the associated, multi-source intelligence production processes and participants that are accountable for that target
- Fundamentals of national support to military operations (including participation in surge operations into forward areas)

The second tour (within FIOC, collocated with NSA CC) will not require relocation of individual – just a change of workcenter – but will focus on leveraging national data for maritime (numbered fleet / JFMCC) priorities, the execution of JFMCC tasking, and deployed operations in forward areas.

Tours for Lieutenants will be (1) embedded service with deploying Navy units (PCS Afloat, VQ service, and Direct Support Officer for combatants) to develop warfare competencies and broaden their understanding of other warfare areas; (2) graduate education in residence and/or (3) the opportunity to serve on a major staff as a junior officer. Successive tours will continue to build in scope of responsibility, while building cultural and war-fighting competence. At the senior O-5 level, we will focus more on building corporate competencies through continued education, acquisition-related tours, and major staff duty. The future promotion gates for IW Officers are depicted in the insert below by the grey arrows and include:


- For selection to LCDR, an officer will complete the IW Officer PQS; deploy as an embedded IW officer on ships, aircraft, submarines, or with Navy Special Warfare (over 380 opportunities); and complete twelve continuing education units focused on foreign culture and technology.
- For selection to CDR, an officer will complete a Masters Degree (over 85 opportunities for in-residence school, unlimited off-duty opportunities); serve as an IW mission manager (130+ opportunities as Strike Group CRC, FIOC watch commander, or NIWA network attack mission manager); and complete nine continuing education units focused on culture and war fighting.



- For selection to CAPT, an officer will serve as an IW officer, in an IW billet, on an operational Flag's staff at the O4 or O5 pay grade (110+ opportunities – including Strike Group CRC, Strike Group Deputy IWC, numbered fleet CRC, numbered fleet staff cryptologist, numbered fleet N39, JTF 519 O4 and O5 operational tours, etc.); serve in the Pentagon, NSA, FFC, NNWC or COCOM staff at the O4 or O5 pay grade (over 200 opportunities); and complete nine continuing education units focused on culture and corporate skills.

We will build corporate competencies in our Commanders and Captains that make them competitive for Flag selection, including command (20+ opportunities); achieved Joint Service Officer qualification (over 110 opportunities); and continuing education units focused on corporate / executive level skills.

Analysis of the last two years of data on how our officers enter, promote, and exit the community indicates the need for major overhaul of our accession strategy. (1) Our billet base is swollen at the middle pay-grades and too small at the junior pay-grades. This is a simple function of having many, un-coordinated demand signals for action officers and



requires community leadership across manpower BSOs. (2) Our accession strategy, as-is, relies on lateral transfers from other (URL) communities and significant numbers of LDO conversions (6440 to 1610) to compensate for excessive billets authorized at the LT level and insufficient direct accession numbers. Each of the “big three” URL communities have strategies to significantly reduce the officers available for lateral transfer and we must reduce our dependence on this source. (3) Analysis of egress timing for retiring personnel shows that on average, our LCDRs that are retirement-eligible (due to prior enlisted service), retire with three years time in grade, taking with them much operational experience and development investment. Our strategy is to reduce lateral accessions and increase direct accessions, maximizing USNA and NROTC officers and focusing OCS accessions on candidates with less than six years enlisted service. We are working with Task Force Total Force to identify and affect policy barriers associated with this overhaul.

Chief Warrant Officer – Information Warfare. Our warrants are not employed in jobs that are an extension of their enlisted rating expertise. Instead their work focuses on making them competitive for promotion against every other warrant community. This unfortunately has created an unnatural, disconnected career path. For example, a linguist who becomes a Warrant will be detailed to duty as a division officer on a cruiser where his or her (very expensive) language training will not be valued. That operational deployment experience can and likely will retire with the Warrant within six or eight years, whereas employing a LT 1610 as that division officer, could potentially pay dividends to the community and the Navy for fourteen to twenty-four years. We are misusing our warrants in order to allow them to compete for promotion and not capitalizing on the training and experience investment made while they were enlisted.

Our strategy for our Warrant community is to make them an extension of their core rating, delivering ultra-experts that still perform the work that they were trained to do and more

importantly, having the target expertise to succeed. Warrants from the CTI rating will still use their language skills and be technical leaders from the operations floor. Our CTR and CTT warrants will be IW planners that apply over a decade of target knowledge to influencing the information battlespace. We will employ warrants in their rating at the FIOCs and NSA Centers and surge them as IW planners. An associate's degree will be required to promote to CWO3, just as it will be to make Senior Chief in the enlisted ranks. Completion of JOPES and IW planning courses will be required to promote to CWO4 and an operational tour as a senior mission manager will be required to promote to CWO5. We will work with OPNAV and NPC to deliver a better promotion strategy for our warrants, either to take over community management, or to create a separate promotion category within the Navy warrant community that allows the Navy to continue to gain value from the investment in their enlisted experience and skills development.

Limited Duty Officer – Information Warfare. Our strategy is to merge the 161X and 644X designators and discontinue the LDO program. Our goals in analyzing and developing the career path for our LDOs were to: (1) capitalize on their enlisted rating experience and KSAs and (2) design a career path that makes our LDOs competitive for promotion as an LDO through the LCDR pay-grade and as a 1610 for those who wish to lateral transfer and compete for CDR. The first goal is duplicative of our strategy for our Warrants. To achieve the second goal, we must disconnect the officer from his prior rating knowledge in order to send him / her to sea so that he / she is competitive for promotion. We believe this to be a poor return on investment because it discards the rating experience built during enlisted service and the operational experience 6440s obtain is at the expense of 1610s. Further, historical data indicates that this experience is going to exit the community at the mid pay-grades leaving our senior pay-grades with that much less operational experience. The people who are LDOs are valued members of our community and we intend to integrate them and promote them as 1610s given approval of a NOOCS proposal to merge the two designators.

Reserve component integration. In a fully integrated military force, what is content rich for the active component is content rich for the reserve component. Our strategy will be to classify the reserve component by the same knowledge, skills, and abilities as our active component, and to align each reservist to a target. We will utilize the Operational Support Office (OSO) construct to database and network the person, skills, target expertise, and drill dates for the mission owners at the FIOCs to be managed as part of their workforce. Our reserve component enjoys high data-rate connectivity at the SCI-level at over twenty reserve centers across the nation. Regardless of drill location, their service will align to the FIOC that is accountable for their target expertise. Our strategy is to account for, plan for, and integrate our reserve component's drill time into watch floor operations, not on special projects that the active component doesn't have time to do, but on the same, content-rich work that is being analyzed on watch by active component counterparts. We envision reserve component personnel writing tactical reports on what matters most to the maritime commander – usable information that matters – a total force approach.

We have analyzed our reserve officer community and found great gaps in accountability for cross-BSO billet and inventory. We will work to build detailer-like accountability, collocated with the active component detailing and community management functions. We are pursuing a civilian position at NPC 4410 to provide continuity for total force accession planning and management.

Each of our enlisted rating leads is conducting internal labor market analysis for the reserve component. Our strategy is to roll-up junior billets to account for and rely upon, fully trained active component transition into the reserve component. We are working to identify

and eliminate barriers that would hinder off and on ramps between the active and reserve components of our community.


Cryptologic Technician Interpretive (CTI). Our language analysts will begin and spend the majority of their career at an NSA Center. We will focus initial training on six languages (Chinese, Korean, Arabic, Persian Farsi, Russian, and Spanish) with a goal of having fifty percent of the force qualified in a second, lower density language. Our strategy includes promoting within language through the Chief Petty Officer ranks along these swim lanes (depicted in the inset) to maintain technical focus at the khaki level and extending language utilization through the Senior Chief Petty Officer (and Warrant Officer) level.

Future CTI Enlisted Manning Codes					
B519 - CTICM					
B516 Eastern Europe Area Expert CTICS	B515 Latin America Area Expert CTICS	B518 East Asia/Pacific Area Expert CTICS		B517 Mid East/SW Asia/Africa Area Expert CTICS	
B516	B515	B514	B513	B512	B511
Russian & Related less commonly taught languages	Spanish & Related less commonly taught languages	Korean & Related less commonly taught languages	Chinese & Related less commonly taught languages	Persian-Farsi & Related less commonly taught languages and dialects	Arabic & Related less commonly taught languages and dialects
CTI3-CTIC	CTI3-CTIC	CTI3-CTIC	CTI3-CTIC	CTI3-CTIC	CTI3-CTIC
B100 – Seaman					

Cryptologic Technician Networks (CTN). Our networks analysts will begin and spend the majority of their careers at the NSA Centers and NAVCIRT, with expected emphasis on NSA Washington. CTN billets will be fully embedded in the national and strategic exploit, defend, and attack efforts, to include billets at the FIOCs, producing and developing the Navy’s network operations experts. The CTN rating stood up in FY04 and its billet structure is still developing. CTN will become an accession rating in FY 08. While there are currently only 600 CTN billets in the Navy, we expect future growth to 1,100 or more billets as this mission area continues to expand. While not as critical in its current state, our strategy is that regionalization for target depth will be necessary for CTNs in the future just as it is today for CTIs and CTRs.

Cryptologic Technician Collection (CTR). Our communications signals and target analysts will begin and spend the majority of their career at the same NSA Center, working the target for the nation and surging from that center to work the same target afloat or airborne. CTRs will attain certification and qualification on MCS-21 sensor/weapons systems prior to deploying. As with most of our enlisted ratings, the CTR rating has far too many billets (and accompanying inventory) at the E7 and E6 pay-grades and not enough at the junior pay-grades. Further, the mission of our junior CTRs has always been “basic collection operations,” growing into either signals or target analysts at the mid-level pay-grades. New systems (national and fleet) that automate collection are being delivered

leaving the junior pay-grades without viable work. We are developing a new strategy for delivering the valued analysis training earlier in the CTR pipeline to produce much-needed analysts to focus on the automated collection. The insert depicts our vision for developing expert IW planners that know the target and how to best influence the information battlespace.



Cryptologic Technician Technical (CTT). Our radars signals and target analysts will begin their career afloat or at an NSA Center with emphasis on NSA Colorado. Follow-on tours will interleave between afloat and national tours. Regionalization is desired but not as critical to the rating in its current state. We will however, surge our Battle Force ELINT Analysts (9102 NEC) and our technical ELINT signals analysts (9141 NEC) from the FIOCs to deliver analysts that not only know the radars but how the target uses its radars. The insert above depicts our vision for developing expert IW planners that know the target and how to best influence the information battlespace. It is our strategy to migrate CTT maintenance functions to another Navy rating that does electronic maintenance so that we can eliminate duplicative training and skills. We are working with the Enlisted Community Managers and via Task Force Total Force to coordinate with manpower BSOs and community leaders to accomplish this transformation.

Cryptologic Technician Communications (CTO). The CTO / IT rating merger is approved for completion by January 2007. Navy-wide, CTO manpower and personnel will automatically become a part of the IT rating. As a command, vice community lead, our strategy will be to CIVSUB shore-based, non-military essential information technology functions at the Navy Information Operations Commands for a contracted solution.

Cryptologic Technician Administrative (CTA). While the timeline is not yet developed, the CTA rating is included in the proposed merger of Navy administrative ratings. As with

CTOs, our command strategy will be to CIVSUB shore-based, non-military essential administrative functions at the Navy Information Operations Commands for a contracted solution to align with the Navy's HCS.

Cryptologic Technician Maintenance (CTM). We are just beginning rating merger discussions with the ET community for the military essential functions of the CTM rating. The first sixteen weeks of CTM A-school is duplicative of the ET course and we believe this is a great candidate for merger. The majority of the installation and maintenance work that CTMs do ashore is not military essential and our strategy is to CIVSUB these functions at the Navy Information Operations Commands for a contracted solution prior to the rating merger.

Way ahead

We must not confuse change, to include the possible mergers of ratings or designators, as a sign that our community is not valued or appreciated. In fact, the opposite is true. The professionals who **want it, get it, know it, and use it** are critical to our freedom and will be for the foreseeable future. The world has changed and our duty to our nation and Navy requires us to transform - this is our strategy for creating value to that changed world. Strategy is work never completed and our planned implementation will require continuous course corrections over time as the world continues to change. Our success will be determined by the strength of shared vision of our leaders and the commitment of all hands. **Right skills...right place...right time.**



A.M. SINGER
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander

“You, the men and women of the United States Navy, Sailors all – active reserve and civilian – are its lifeblood. You are the world’s best, and I am committed to your growth and development.”

ADM Mike Mullen, CNO
23 July 2005